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Abstract
Retail is a dynamic sector and for several decades shopping centres have been the most successful format. 
Although such shopping centres have been held responsible for the decline of other retail concepts, they are not 
without problems and some retail precincts are losing their viability, becoming dead malls. Some other shopping 
centres however are quite resilient. In this study we analyse the different retail resilience strategies used by older 
shopping centres to overcome their declining trend. For empirical evidence we adopt a case study methodology 
and fieldwork to investigate the evolution of all old shopping centres in Lisbon, confirming that a general trend 
of decline is affecting a large majority of those retail precincts. Refining our analysis, we interviewed managers 
from three shopping centres that remain viable. We conclude that a wide range of strategies can be implemented, 
all of which enhance the relevance of the shopping centre management structures.
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1. Introduction
The retail sector has been characterised throughout 
history by its dynamism, contributing to a significant number 
of transformations in cities. Looking back, we can see the 
passage from a more itinerant retailing, held at fairs, markets 
and temporary venues, to newer landscapes dominated by 
permanent or long-standing locations. In terms of concepts, 
retail practised in fairs and open-air markets began to be 
connoted negatively, due to the modernity that new concepts 
progressively introduced into the sector. For example, the 
appearance and dissemination of hypermarkets in France 
provoked significant changes in the retail structure of that 
country (Colla, 2003; Metton, 1995). Other concepts such as 
‘hard-discount’ or the fachmarkt (Pereira et al., 2002) were 
also relevant in modernising the retail sector, in this case in 
Germany. In a more comprehensive view, shopping centres 
have been the most successful concept because, generally, 
they were able to stay on top of consumer preferences since 
their inception to the present day. Although with world-wide 
presence, the shopping centre designation itself has covered 
very different retail precincts, from small ones located in the 
dense urban fabric, such as the shopping arcades in Paris, 
to the larger shopping centres located on the outskirts of 
medium and large-sized cities.
Over the last few decades, these retail precincts have been 
held responsible for the declining vitality and viability of 
town centres (Ozuduru et al., 2014; Teller, 2008), in a process 
that according to Guy (2007) begins with the opening of 
a new off-centre shopping centre, leading to an increase of 
vacant shop units and a worsening environment of the town 
centre. One of the major scientific concerns on this subject 
has addressed the relations between the large peripheral 
shopping centres and the traditional and consolidated town 
centres (Evers, 2006; Guimar�es, 2014; Guy, 1998; Thomas 
and Bromley, 2002). Despite the success that has culminated 
in negative impacts on other retail concepts, shopping 
centres are by no means immune to failure and several retail 
premises have closed or are on the edge of such a fate. The 
use of the term “dead malls” reflects this evidence and has 
been particularly applied to describe the “closed or on the 
verge of closing” (Ferreira and Paiva, 2017, p. 5) suburban 
shopping centres in North America.
When compared to Europe, the phenomenon of dead 
malls is at a more advanced stage (Feronti, 2003) in the 
North American context, and since the dawn of the new 
millennium the number of dead malls has been reaching 
alarming levels there (Cavoto and Limonta, 2013). 
In Europe, because of delays in the dissemination of 
shopping centres, dead malls are starting to gain the 
attention of urban planners. In fact, their decline is 
significant regardless of locations closer to or farther away 
from consolidated urban and town centres. Still, after 
experiencing some sort of shock, some retail precincts can 
overcome the problems and remain viable.
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Appealing to resilience theory, currently widely used 
in several different contexts, in this article we aim to 
understand the strategies that contribute to the resilience 
of shopping centres so that they have managed to keep 
operating, thus contributing to the vitality of urban centres. 
As empirical evidence of such resilience strategies, we will 
use the city of Lisbon as a case study. Our research is guided 
by a set of research questions: What is the current situation 
of the shopping centres operating in Lisbon compared 
to the base-line year 1999? What have been the resilience 
features introduced for the ones still operating? We argue 
that despite sharing many similarities, it is the dynamism 
of the shopping centres’ management structures (i.e. [and 
hereinafter] the managers themselves {sometimes referred 
to simply as ‘management’} as much as their organisational 
aspects) that have fostered their resilience.
In the next section we will analyse resilience, the main 
concept used in our argument. In the third section we present 
the materials and methods used in this research, framing 
the following section, in which we analyse the evolution of 
the shopping centres in Lisbon that were already operating 
in 1999, subsequently deepening our focus to three shopping 
centres where we discuss their resilience strategies. Finally, 
some conclusions will be drawn.
2. Theoretical background
2.1 The dual role of shopping centres
The strong relationships between cities and their 
commercial fabrics result in webs of interactions, through 
which both are influenced by each other. Shopping 
centres are an example of such relations and can be better 
exemplified through two different roles: actor and victim, as 
described below.
The role of actor is characterised by their capacity to 
increase the vitality and viability of a certain area. Recent 
examples of such a role include several urban regeneration 
projects that used shopping centres as anchors to regenerate 
town centres (Jayne, 2006; Lowe, 2005, 2007). This protection 
of town centres is partially due to the local population’s 
(not necessarily resident) and tourists’ valuation of these 
areas (Guimar�es, 2013). In this role, shopping centres 
are important when they are built in peripheral areas, by 
providing the local population with spaces where they can 
supply themselves. In fact, shopping centres are relevant 
facilities that contribute to the supply of population 
(especially in the period where there is a loss of importance 
of town centres and simultaneous suburbanisation).
Additionally, when located in deprived areas, shopping 
centres often provide social functions for local communities. 
As stated by Parlette and Cowen (2011, p. 795), “while 
privately owned and managed, enclosed malls in inner 
suburbs are at times the only indoor spaces that offer some 
degree of public access”. This is in line with De Simone’s 
(2018, p. 13) reflections about Parque Arauco, a large 
shopping centre that opened in Chile in 1982, seen as a place 
where people go to “chat, walk, play, and not necessarily 
buy” (author’s translation). Furthermore, despite criticism 
about the privatisation of public space caused by shopping 
centres, Chiodelli and Moroni (2015, p. 40) concluded that 
“shopping malls do not necessarily privatise any public 
space” and that in most cases, the construction of shopping 
centres is made on private land that would rarely have 
some sort of public use.
Shopping centres were also relevant in the modernisation 
of the retail system and in increasing the retail fabric, 
usually with longer opening hours, which overall benefited 
a significant part of the population. Furthermore, by 
possessing management structure, they contributed to 
introduce this feature into the retail sector. According to 
Lewis (2014), there are four major roles of the shopping 
centre management structure: Operations, Marketing, 
Administration, and Executive & Other disciplines. The 
existence of a management structure is clearly one of 
the factors that, in general terms, differentiate shopping 
centres from traditional high street retail. Its influence on 
the resilience of shopping centres will be scrutinised in the 
section devoted to the empirical analysis, below.
The role of victim occurs when a certain urban area is 
deprived of their main elements of attractiveness and 
declines, weakening the viability of existing retail outlets. 
Paradoxically, this deprivation is provoked by urban 
changes which, occasionally, happen because private 
retail developers invest in different areas. The most 
iconic example is the implementation of shopping centres 
in peripheral areas and their impact on town centres. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the evolution of retail 
also provokes impacts on already existing shopping centres. 
Concretely, urban sprawl in North America is provoking the 
constant opening of new shopping centres in increasingly 
remote locations. Such an evolution has been putting into 
question the viability of older shopping centres, resulting 
in their decline and eventually leading to the appearance of 
dead malls. According to Parlette and Cowen (2011, p. 795), 
this process derives from the “capitalist cycle of investment, 
disinvestment and re-investment”. These authors show how 
the dissemination of big box stores and the revitalisation of 
central areas of cities contributed to the loss of importance 
of some suburban shopping centres.
In a similar way, focusing on the Greater Toronto Area, 
Hernandez (2003) and Jones and Doucet (2001) confirmed 
the negative impacts of some big box stores on the traditional 
retail structure of that region. According to these authors, 
their emergence as major retail destinations “left some 
shopping centres and many of their tenants in vulnerable 
positions” (2001, p. 507). The dynamism of shopping centres 
was also one of the main reasons that resulted in the decline 
of some retail premises, i.e. “competition from newer, bigger 
and brighter malls has resulted in declining sales and high 
store vacancy rates in first ring suburban shopping centres” 
(Feronti, 2003, p. x), representing the adaptive behaviour 
drawn from Darwin’s natural selection concept as discussed 
by Lowry (1997). Other structural factors have been held 
responsible for dead malls, such as the dissemination 
of outlet malls, the rising importance of e-commerce 
(Schatzman, 2013), and more recently the “tightening of 
consumer spending and the de-valuation of commercial real 
estate in the United States as a result of the global financial 
crisis” (Scharoun, 2012, p. 110). The work of Lowry (1997) on 
the life cycle of shopping centres can also help to explain the 
evolution of those retail precincts. According to this author, 
four stages characterise this cycle: innovation, accelerated 
development, maturity and decline (see Tab. 1).
Due to several interconnected reasons, such as their 
location in relation to the main urban centres and size of 
the urbanised area where shopping centres are located, the 
retail precincts that have closed doors or are in full process 
of decline are now a pressing challenge for urban planning. 
This situation of a decline is not, however, inevitable. Some 
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of those retail precincts have managed to remain viable and 
continue with the doors open, thus continuing to be a valid 
asset of the retail structure in the urban area in which they 
are inserted. Lowry (1997) claims that survival strategies 
must be adopted by developers, which will be analysed 
further as resilience strategies in this article.
2.2 The concept of resilience and its importance 
for understanding changes in retailing
The concept of resilience has been used and adapted from 
different perspectives and research traditions. According to 
Pizzo (2015), it is possible to trace the first use of the word to 
the 1st century BC. The concept of resilience, however, was 
further developed with its incorporation in the analysis of 
ecological systems (Dolega and Celińska-Janowicz, 2015), 
and especially through the outstanding work of C. S. 
Holling. This author defined resilience as a “measure of the 
persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change 
and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships 
between populations or state variables” (Holling, 1973, 
p. 14). In time, resilience has been incorporated into social 
science studies (Martin, 2012). Although it is a concept that 
has been used for some time, it has been gaining increasing 
relevance today. Its flexibility and the fuzzy ways to measure 
it partially explain its utility to understand and account 
for very different realities: for example, Adger’s (2000) 
comparison of social and ecological resilience; Pisano’s (2012) 
analysis of sustainable development through the lens of 
resilience; and Pizzo’s (2015) discussion of the concept in 
planning theory and practice.
Some of the literature on regional development has 
also included the concept of resilience: for example, 
Hudson’s (2010) work on the characteristics of resilient 
regions, and Hassink’s (2010) research on the relations 
between regional resilience and regional economic 
adaptability. Resilience was also a key concept for 
Forino (2015) in his analysis of L’Aquila, a small town in 
southern Italy, following the earthquake that took place 
in 2009. Martin (2012) points out that a succession of major 
natural and environmental disasters and the subsequent 
reaction of local communities, fostered interest in the study 
of resilience as a concept able to explain different phenomena 
and events. The need for a certain system to adapt itself 
and be resilient implies the existence of a certain trigger. 
According to its temporal impact, Erkip (2015) distinguished 
two different kinds of trigger: “shocks” (pulse), which can be 
exemplified by events such as earthquakes; and “slow-burn 
changes”, that fit the analysis of complex urban systems 
and their dynamism, because changes are continuously 
introduced into cities.
When considering the concept of resilience, three different 
interpretations can be distinguished and used for a study 
of retail resilience: the engineering, ecological and adaptive 
approaches (Martin, 2012). The first, engineering approach 
is one “in which resilience is regarded as a response to 
external disturbances and a move back to a steady state” 
(Boschma, 2015, p. 734), wherein the system will tend to 
equilibrium. To characterise this situation Wrigley and 
Dolega (2011) use the term “bounce back”, which is to 
some extent related to the resistance to changes. The 
second interpretation follows an ecological approach 
and it “focuses on the scale of shock a system can absorb 
before it is destabilised and moved to a new configuration” 
(Dolega and Celińska-Janowicz, 2015, p. 12). Contrary to 
the engineering approach where the focus is on the ability 
of a certain system to resume to its pre-shock state, the 
ecological approach focuses on how much shock can the 
system support (Wrigley and Dolega, 2011). Finally, the 
third interpretation refers to the adaptive approach and 
follows an evolutionary stance. In this case, the system will 
be different when comparing the stage pre-disturbance to 
the stage when resilience is accomplished. For this matter, 
Wrigley and Brookes (2014) use the term “bounce forward” 
to describe the approach. It means the system will end up 
a step forward with respect to its starting point.
This adaptive capacity is particularly important in the 
study of urban systems. Earlier, Holling (2001) had already 
enhanced this feature, considering adaptive capacity as “the 
resilience of the system, a measure of its vulnerability to 
unexpected or unpredictable shocks”. The changing nature 
of urban areas makes it virtually impossible to analyse them 
from a stability perspective. Simmie and Martin (2010) point 
this out when stating that “regional and local economic 
development is far from a smooth and incremental process 
but is subject to all sorts of interruptions and disruptions”. 
Thus, resilience acquires relevance as a useful concept 
to uncover and understand the complex and continuous 
process of changes that characterise cities. From an urban 
planning standpoint, the use of resilience from an adaptive 
point of view is preferred, rather than the bounce back 
perspective. The use of the latter method could lead to the 
constant obsolescence of policies almost immediately after 
their implementation.
Because it can be an asset in understanding urban 
problems, the concept of resilience has been used to analyse 
how town centres and retail stores have managed to deal 
with the transformation of the retail sector. In this context, 
some research has been carried out (Barata-Salgueiro and 
Erkip,2014; Cachinho, 2014; D’Alessandro, 2015; Erkip, 2015; 
Karrholm et al., 2014; Wrigley and Brookes, 2014; Wrigley 
Tab. 1: Some considerations of Lowry’s shopping centre life cycle stages
Source: After Lowry (1997)
Considerations
Stages
Innovation Accelerated development Maturity Decline
Number of competing centres very few rapid growth many of the same type 
of centre
many same 
and newer types
Vacancy rate low very low moderate high
Renovation of facilities none minor modifications maintenance of existing 
facilities
neglect or extensive 
reformatting
Control exerted by developers extensive moderate extensive moderate
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and Dolega, 2011). Moreover, a recent Urban-Net European 
funded project – REPLACIS, Retail Planning for Cities 
Sustainability – devoted to the resilience of town centres, 
defined urban retail resilience as “the ability of different 
types of retailing at different scales, to adapt to changes, 
crises or shock that challenge the system’s equilibrium, 
without failing to perform its functions in a sustainable way” 
(Barata-Salgueiro, 2011, p. 30).
More attention has been given to the resilience of town 
centres, rather than on the resilience of retail stores and 
specific retail concepts, because a retailer’s strategies, 
as studied by Erkip et al. (2014), can only partially explain 
the evolution of a certain centre (Teller et al., 2016). Thus, 
the scientific discussion revolved around the ability of town 
centres to remain an important retail destination within the 
respective urban region where they are located. For instance, 
the works of Wrigley and Brookes (2014) and Wrigley and 
Dolega (2011) are good examples of such research in British 
research on the subject. In the former, an edited collection 
contains several chapters that focus on the evolution of high 
streets, seen through the lens of resilience. Other researchers 
have focused on different geographical contexts: for example, 
the Cities special issue on retail planning and urban resilience 
(Barata-Salgueiro and Erkip, 2014) presented case studies 
from other countries, such as Portugal (Cachinho, 2014), 
Sweden (Karrholm et al., 2014), Turkey (Erkip et al., 2014; 
Ozuduru et al., 2014) and the United States (Balsas, 2014).
When dealing with the resilience of town centres, several 
factors have been introduced to explain why some areas 
have managed to be resilient while others failed. In this 
perspective, resilience is understood from the adaptive 
perspective as the ability of a certain system (here, the urban 
retail system) to comply and absorb changes and shocks 
and to restructure itself to still perform its functions in an 
improved way (here, to fulfil the provision of consumers). 
In the work of Wrigley and Brookes (2014), two major 
dimensions are analysed: public policies (Findlay and 
Sparks, 2014); and the governance of town centres (Coca-
Stefaniak and Carroll, 2014). Besides these two factors, 
Cachinho and Barata-Salgueiro (2016) considered urban 
space attributes and the internal features of the urban retail 
system as crucial for its resilience.
Although increasing theoretical debates are found in the 
scientific literature, there is a lack of empirical evidence 
documenting the main features that contribute to the 
resilience of urban systems, in general, and especially 
urban retail systems. Although it was focused on the 
resilience of retail stores, the study of Erkip et al. (2014) is 
an exception. In this work, a survey of retailers in Ankara, 
Turkey, concluded that the relevance of strategies, such as 
the introduction of home delivery or private service buses, 
added services to the client, physical improvements and 
involvement in associations. With respect to the capacity of 
shopping centres to be resilient, the literature is even scarcer. 
Still, because of the size and location of most of these retail 
precincts, the inability of even just one shopping centre 
to be resilient and thus decline and close their operation, 
is a significant urban planning problem. Regarding the 
subject of dead malls, a study from the Congress for the 
New Urbanism (2001) found that shopping centre owners 
managed to requalify abandoned shopping centres into 
back offices or data centres. In several of these cases, 
although the former retail precinct lost its civic role, the 
building managed to maintain some value as a real estate 
asset. Focusing on the shopping centre Roma in Lisbon, 
Ferreira (2015) concluded that the vitality of the shopping 
district, its accessibility and the management structure 
of the shopping centre was crucial in its revitalisation. In 
this case study, we intend to contribute to the scientific 
literature by analysing the strategies that contributed to 
the resilience of some shopping centres in Lisbon.
3. Material and methods
To respond our research questions and make inferences 
about our argument, we use Lisbon as an empirical case 
study. As a baseline, we consider shopping centres located 
in Lisbon that were operating in 1999, as the database that 
supported this study was collected in 1999 by Observatório 
do Comércio (2000). This database was updated through 
fieldwork developed by the author in 2017. This updating 
allowed us to document the evolution of shopping centres 
in Lisbon to answer the first research question. Elaborating 
on the work of Ferreira (2015), we classified shopping 
centres according to four major categories: 
1. vital – referring to shopping centres with 9.9% or less 
vacancy rate;
2. struggling – for shopping centres with vacancy rates 
between 10.0 and 39.9%;
3. greyfields – for shopping centres with vacancy rates 
of 40.0% to 69.9%; and
4. dead malls – for the remaining shopping centres with 
vacancy rates of 70.0% or higher.
Subsequently, we focus the analysis on three shopping 
centres that are still in operation and which have 
considerable momentum. Using structured open-ended 
interviews, the manager of each of the shopping centres was 
interviewed. Under this category of interviewing, the same 
questions were asked to the three interviewees to “increase 
the comparability of responses” (Kitchin and Tate, 2000, 
p. 214). After proper ethical consent, all interviews 
involved audio recording and subsequent transcription. 
The questions that were asked can be summarised as the 
following general topics: a description of the shopping 
centre and its origins; the existence in the past of a decline 
phase, its causes and resilience strategies; the main current 
threats to existence; the current resilience strategies; the 
evolution of customer-target objectives; and other relevant 
(for the interviewee) information.
4. Results: Shopping centres in Lisbon
4.1 Background
Shopping centres emerged in Portugal in the 1970s, although 
it was in the following two decades that the concept witnessed 
its most significant dissemination (Guimar�es, 2015). 
Nevertheless, in these earlier stages, shopping centres were 
characterised by their small size, their integration into the 
urban fabric, and the lack of a professional management 
structure: in fact, their organisational structure resembled 
a commercial condominium (Teixeira, 2014).
As in the Turkish case analysed by Erkip and Ozuduru 
(2015), the emergence of a new generation of shopping centres 
also contributed to the decline of the oldest retail precincts 
in Portugal. Ferreira (2015) identified three variables that 
may have contributed to the decline of shopping centres 
in the Lisbon region: the physical structure of the retail 
precints, not adapted to newer requirements of consumption 
and leisure; the knowledge levels of their managers; and the 
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management structures of those retail premises. The latter 
variable is related to the fact that parts of the shopping 
centres were in fact commercial condominiums (Ferreira 
and Paiva, 2017), where each store was sold individually to 
different retailers, which transformed shopping centres into 
a mere real estate development.
Contrary to the North American context, where big box 
stores and power centres (in the European context – retail 
parks) contributed to the decline of some shopping centres 
(Jones and Doucet, 2001), in Portuguese retail structure 
there is not such a tradition of category killers. Ikea is the 
most well-known exception with five stores in the country 
(covering the two metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Oporto 
[each with two stores] and another one in Algarve). Besides, 
some international companies are established in big box 
stores such as Decathlon, Leroy Merlin, Staples or Media 
Markt. Additionally, some retail parks were constructed 
in several Portuguese cities in this millennium, but their 
relevance never reached a status that could put into the 
question the already consolidated retail system.
In 1999, 55 shopping centres (Fig. 1) were operating 
within the boundaries of Lisbon municipality (Observatório 
do Comércio, 2000), 10 of which were opened in the 1970s, 
27 in the 1980s and 18 in the 1990s. Their characteristics 
reveal the fragility of the Lisbon shopping centres industry 
at the verge of the new millennium. This fragility was further 
put to the test after the mid-1990s with the emergence of 
new regional shopping centres. Although the majority of 
the old shopping centres had a management structure, 
in several cases it merely consisted of shopkeepers’ 
commissions without professional management. They 
were mainly seen as real estate developments, rather 
than integrated commercial developments, evidenced by 
the fact that 40% of the retail precincts operated with a 
mix of rent and own store ownership (see Tab. 2). Other 
indicators also point in this direction, such as the absence 
of a planned tenant mix, anchor stores and franchising 
stores. The small size of shopping centres is, to a certain 
extent, a consequence of their location in the densely 
urbanised town centres or in its surroundings, as well as 
their implementation in pre-existent buildings. Even when 
the building was built for that purpose, it had to face the 
obvious limitations of its location in very urbanised, densely 
populated areas. Consequently, the majority of shopping 
centres fit the Portuguese Association of Shopping Centres 
(APCC, 2011) definition of “very small” with 500 to 4,999 
sq. metres of sales area (classification adapted from the 
International Council of Shopping Centres). Furthermore, 
the motorisation rate had escalated quickly in the last two 
decades of the 20th century, such that shopping centres that 
did not possess parking spaces (58.2% of the total shopping 
centres) quickly became outdated.
In these 55 shopping centres, three with regional 
catchment areas are included: Amoreiras, the first regional 
shopping centre in the Lisbon region, opened in 1985; 
Colombo, inaugurated in 1997 in a residential neighbourhood 
with good road connections; and Vasco da Gama, opened 
in 1999 following the urban renovation project in the eastern 
part of the city where the 1998 Lisbon World Exposition took 
place. Together with the opening of other shopping centres 
in the mid- and late-1990s with a sales area up to 15,000 sq. 
metres, such as Olivais, they represented a new generation 
of shopping centres that would put into question the viability 
of the pre-existent retail precincts, including those also 
opened in this period but without any kind of innovations 
when compared with those already existing. Based on 
these data and taking Lowry’s life cycle thesis (Tab. 1) into 
consideration, one may argue that in the last three decades 
of the 20th century the Lisbon shopping centre industry went 
very quickly from the innovation stage to the accelerated 
Fig. 1: Location and characteristics of Lisbon shopping centres 
Source: author's fieldwork (2017)
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Tab. 2: Characteristics of shopping centres operating in Lisbon municipality in 1999 
Source: Observatório do comércio (2000)
Characteristics Number %
Management Structure Yes 52 94.5
No 3 5.5
Parking Yes 18 32.7
No 32 58.2
No data available 5 9.1
Planned tenant mix Yes 27 49.1
No 27 49.1
No data available 1 1.8
Anchor stores Yes 21 38.2
No 32 58.2
No data available 2 3.6
Sale area Very small (500 – 4,999 sq. metres) 46 83.6
Small (5,000 – 19,999 sq. metres) 5 9.1
Medium (20,000 – 39,999 sq. metres) 2 3.6
Large (40,000 – 79,999 sq. metres) 1 1.8
Very large ( > 80,000 sq. metres) 1 1.8
Food and drinks 0 – 5 stores 41 74.5
6 – 10 stores 6 10.9
More than 10 stores 8 14.5
Stores ownership Rent 27 49.1
Purchase 1 1.8
Mix system 22 40.0
No data available 5 9.1
Form of management Shopkeepers commission 12 21.8
Management company 43 78.2
Building type Adapted 15 27.3
Built on purpose 37 67.3
No data available 3 5.5
Number of stores 50 or less 37 67.3
51 – 100 14 25.5
100 or more 4 7.3
Opening year (by decade) 1970's 10 18.2
1980's 27 49.1
1990's 18 32.7
Vacant stores (%) 0 – 9.9 21 38.0
10 – 39.9 24 44.0
40 – 69.9 6 11.0
70 and more 4 7.0
Location City centre 8 14.5
City centre expansion axis 27 49.1
Residential neighbourhood 14 25.5
Periphery 2 3.6
New developments (periphery) 2 3.6
No data available 2 3.6
Franchising Yes 20 36.4
No 33 60.0
No data available 2 3.6
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development and maturity stages, mostly because there was 
a significant growth in the number of shopping centres and 
the vacancy rates in 1999 were already substantial.
The data analysed below inform us how many of those 
shopping centres entered into the decline stage and were 
not able to reverse the situation, becoming dead malls, and 
how many of them did manage to circumvent that stage or, if 
reached, emerge from it, being resilient.
4.2 Evolution of shopping centres
In general terms, the shopping centres in Lisbon had 
already experienced some decline by 1999 (see Tab. 3). Still, 
this trend worsened further by 2017. The number of physical 
spaces for stores suffered a significant decrease, from 3,106 
in 1999 to 2,382 in 2017. Two reasons can be used to explain 
this evolution. The first concerns readjustments in the 
physical layout of stores. Taking advantage of decreases in 
rental prices, some retailers grouped several stores into one 
(in this way, the overall retail floorspace remained equal). 
The second is related to the option of management to close 
several floors of the shopping centres due to the high or 
absolute vacancy rates that were being felt (in this case, 
there is an effective loss of available retail floorspace in the 
precinct). Following the same trend of decline, the number 
of occupied stores suffered a significant loss. In total, 
the 55 shopping centres lost almost one-third of the number 
of stores operating in 1999. Taking all things together, the 
vacancy rate increased from 15.7% to 24.9%, meaning that 
in 2017, one in four stores was closed.
These already worrying changes already take into 
consideration the two measures outlined above that 
diminished the available stores, which only serves to cover the 
real dimensions of the problem. Hence, if one considers the 
stores that were currently operating in 2017 and the physical 
spaces available for stores in 1999, we reach a vacancy rate 
of 42.5%. The data reveal that between 1999 and 2017 there 
was an inversion of the position of shopping centres. If, 
in 1999, 45 out 55 were still in the stages classified as “vital” and 
“struggling”, in 2017 somewhat less than one half are in those 
two stages, and only 10 shopping centres had a vacancy rate 
of less than 10%. The number of shopping centres classified as 
dead malls increased dramatically from 4 in 1999 to 22 in 2017 
(of which 15 were effectively closed and the remaining 7 had 
vacancy rates higher than 70%).
4.3 Resilience features
To uncover the resilience strategies developed by shopping 
centre management structures, interviews were conducted 
with managers of three shopping centres still operating and 
with considerable momentum, which constituted one of the 
reasons why they were selected. Other reasons were also 
considered, namely the existence of a management structure 
and the respective manager, with whom we could conduct 
the interview. Besides, the three larger shopping centres of 
Colombo, Vasco da Gama and Amoreiras were not considered 
because they are still three of the larger shopping centres 
in the region and their position has not been threatened 
by the regional evolution of retail. Additionally, shopping 
centres that currently fit the category of dead mall were also 
not considered because, even if resilience strategies were 
implemented, apparently they were not successful. Thus, 
taking in consideration these parameters, interviews were 
conducted with managers of the following shopping centres: 
Dolce Vita Monumental (DVM), Fonte Nova (FN) and Pingo 
Doce de Telheiras (PDT) (see Tab. 4). According to the APCC 
shopping centres classification, the first two had a “very 
small” sales area, while the other had a “small” sales area.
4.3.1 Dolce Vita Monumental
This precinct is located closest to the city centre, in the 
new Lisbon CBD and in close proximity to other shopping 
centres. It is located in an historical building that was 
designed and built to host a theatre and a cinema. Named 
“Cine-Teatro Monumental”, it was inaugurated in 1951. 
Due to the opening of other new cinemas in the city and 
the increased importance of television, this cultural space 
declined in the 1970s and eventually closed in the early 1980s. 
After some rehabilitation work that changed its facade 
significantly, the building was reopened as a shopping centre 
in 1993, retaining the name “Monumental” as a remnant of 
its previous function but presenting similar features to those 
of the most recent shopping centres (Tab. 4). Since then, 
major changes have occurred in 2005 and 2006 when the 
retail developers Amorim Imobiliária (first) and Chamartin 
Imobiliária (secondly) acquired this shopping centre. When 
the latter company took possession of the precinct, the first 
major change took place: “Dolce Vita”, a brand that the 
company had already used in other shopping centres, was 
introduced into the Monumental, thus renamed as Dolce 
Vita Monumental. Recognising that this shopping centre 
was outdated, alongside the rebranding, major in-depth 
modifications were made in 2007 to its physical structure 
and layout, which required its closure for three months:
“We took advantage of the three months in which the 
shopping centre was closed to expand the food court area 
and moved some stores that were on the lower floor to the 
top floor (strategic change to reformulate the tenant mix 
layout). We start from the premise that a centrally-located 
shopping centre such as Monumental would have to have 
a strong food court area”. (Retrieved from the interview: 
author's translation).
 1999 2017 Change
Total of stores 3,106 2,382 − 23.3
Total of occupied stores 2,619 1,787 − 31.8
Vacant stores (total) 487 595 22.2
Vacancy rate (%) 15.7 24.9 9.3
Number of shopping centres 
according to the vacancy rate
Vital (< 10%) 21 10 − 11.0
Struggling (10–39.9%) 24 13 − 11.0
Greyfields (40–69.9%) 6 10 4.0
Dead malls (> 70%) 4 7 + 15 18.0
Tab. 3: Evolution of analysed shopping centres in Lisbon
Sources: Observatório do comércio (1999); compiled from author’s fieldwork (2017)
2018, 26(3) MORAVIAN GEOGRAPHICAL REPORTS
167
): 160–172 
The cultural heritage associated with the location 
of DVM was seen as an advantage. Hence, the cinema 
was maintained, mainly attracting a specific audience. 
Furthermore, because this is a very small retail precinct, 
the management structure is aware that it cannot attract 
anchor stores – thus, the cinema itself is the anchor. The 
main change occurred in the food court. Before 2007 
rehabilitation works, the ground floor possessed several 
non-food stores. These stores were then moved to the upper 
floor and, subsequently, the food court was enlarged on the 
ground floor. This change was carried out by management 
based on the principle that a central shopping centre must 
possess a strong offer of food stores in order to attract 
nearby workers. During the rehabilitation work, several 
stores that were underperforming were displaced from the 
DVM to give place to other stores that would attract more 
visitors, increasing the overall quality of the tenant mix. 
The DVM customer-type remained the same: the goal was 
to attract more people of the same type. After that period, 
the changes performed on DVM are shallower:
“Since 2007, investments are constant – now-a-days 
it is not viable to close a shopping centre for 3 months – 
the strategy is to improve progressively: in lighting, in the 
entrance, sofas. Clients like to see changes” (Retrieved from 
the interview: author's translation).
According to the manager this allows the costumer to 
continuously see some modernisation efforts, even if small, 
keeping the attractiveness of the shopping centre. Another 
relevant issue is the 6-years duration of the lease:
“Simply renewing contracts without this implying 
a renovation of the store’s image is no solution. When the 
time for the contract renewal arrives, it is the ideal time 
to renew the store layout” (Retrieved from the interview: 
author’s translation).
This duration of the lease is considered enough for stores to 
obtain profit after modernisation investments. It is expected 
that stores reach break-even in a period of 2 to 3 years, 
having about 3 years of profit, after which they must be 
prepared to make new investments. For the shopping centre 
management structure, this contract duration provides 
a significant margin of negotiation, forcing, when necessary, 
modernisation of the store under the risk of the lease not 
be renewed.
4.3.2 Fonte Nova
With some 4,481 sq. metres of sales area, this shopping 
centre is located in the dense residential area of Benfica, 
near the major green space of the city. It was built as a 
part of a larger project, which included the construction of 
residential buildings with a retail precinct on the ground 
floor. About one decade after the inauguration of Fonte 
Nova in 1985, this retail precinct began to suffer from 
the competition of Colombo, a very large shopping centre 
(122,000 sq. metres of sales area) opened in 1997 and located 
less than 1km away. Altogether, the opening of several 
shopping centres in the region and the economic crisis 
(around 2010 and following years) led to the bankruptcy 
of several businesses that were operating in Fonte Nova, 
partially funded with bank loans. The main difficulty in 
this period was to replace the closing stores with new ones 
of similar quality. One of the resilience strategies was the 
introduction of a risk-sharing management strategy:
“We began to be available to adopt risk sharing (variable 
rents, dependent on the sales value). If it goes well, it goes 
well for everyone and, if it goes wrong, it goes wrong for 
everyone. That is, the onus stopped being just on the side 
of the tenants” (Retrieved from the interview: author's 
translation).
According to this strategy, the value of leases became 
variable, i.e. the rental value became indexed to sales. Thus, 
the burden was shared between the retailer and the shopping 
centre administration. In this period, another management 
strategy was consistency in the selection of new stores for FN. 
When stores were closing, the option was to resist the pressure 
and not accept all stores just to keep low vacancy rate:
“It is better to have a vacant space than a bad store” 
(Retrieved from the interview: author's translation).
Tab. 4: Main features of the three shopping centres analysed in depth
Sources: Adapted from Observatório do Comércio (2000); author's fieldwork (2017)
  Opening year Dolce Vita Monumental Fonte Nova Pingo Doce Telheiras
Stores Physical spaces 1999 33 78 25
2017 33 65 17
In use 1999 33 76 23
2017 30 58 17
Vacant 1999 0 2 2
2017 3 7 0
Vacancy rate 1999 0 2.6 8
2017 9.1 10.8 0
Planned tenant mix (1999; 2017) Yes; Yes Yes; Yes Yes; Yes
Food court (1999; 2017) Yes; Yes Yes; Yes Yes; Yes
Stores ownership (1999; 2017) Rent; Rent Rent; Rent Rent; Rent
Location (1999; 2017) City centre expansion axis Residential neighbourhood Residential neighbourhood
Anchor stores (1999; 2017) Yes; Yes Yes; Yes Yes; Yes
Parking (1999; 2017) Yes; Yes No; Yes Yes; Yes
Management structure (1999; 2017) Management company Management company Management company
MORAVIAN GEOGRAPHICAL REPORTS 2018, 26(3)
168
2018, 26(3): 160–172
This decision was made to keep certain kinds of stores 
planned for a specific customer-type and not lowering the 
quality of the existing tenant mix. Moreover, other strategies 
were also adopted recently:
“A shopping centre with 30 years like this has to change 
something structural. We began to reflect about what could 
be done to bring in more people and then changed the tenant 
mix” (Retrieved from the interview: author's translation).
A food court was created to gather the existing (and new) 
food stores that were dispersed throughout the shopping 
centre. A gymnasium was recently inaugurated in 2017 in 
order to increase overall vitality, replacing the former cinema 
that was operating but with no viability. Taking advantage 
of the supermarket already located in FN, an enlargement 
of this store was negotiated in order to increase its 
attractiveness. Consequently, because with this enlargement 
it was expected that clients would buy more products, a 
direct entrance to the car parking (already existent but 
with no use) was opened. Overall, in order to compete with 
the shopping centre Colombo and others in the region, the 
management structure chose to enhance what differentiates 
FN from others: its convenience, i.e. the possibility to quickly 
enter the shopping centre, shop and leave.
4.3.3 Pingo Doce de Telheiras
This is a considerably different shopping centre compared 
to the two discussed above and it is located further away from 
the city centre. Built in 1996, it is essentially a traditional retail 
precinct composed of an hypermarket and a small commercial 
gallery. It owes its name to the current hypermarket that is 
located here, Pingo Doce. Like several others in the country 
(Guimar�es, 2014), the overall quality of the tenant mix 
evolved and it became more attractive. As a consequence, 
this shopping centre is currently less dependent on the 
hypermarket for attracting consumers. Although located in 
Telheiras, a densely urbanised neighbourhood, its proximity 
to several important road connections allows the PDT 
catchment area to extend well beyond Telheiras. When 
it was built in 1996, the hypermarket was Feira Nova. 
Because both Feira Nova and Pingo Doce belong to Jerónimo 
Martins, a major Portuguese company, a business decision 
made the conversion of the hypermarkets Feira Nova into 
Pingo Doce in 2008. In this period, the shopping centre was 
already experiencing a less vital stage that, roughly, lasted 
from 2005 to 2010. Despite the awareness of the decline 
stage, it was chosen to wait for the aforementioned change of 
brand before major changes were performed, which further 
enhanced its decline. Thus, in 2010 major rehabilitation 
works transformed the shopping centre significantly:
“At the time, in 2010, many shopkeepers left the gallery, 
many shops were not occupied nor were many interested in 
renting” (Retrieved from the interview: author's translation).
In this period, several stores were displaced for the 
reconstruction and there was a lack of new ones to enter PDT. 
In order to diminish the vacancy rate, several services from 
the Jerónimo Martins company headquarters were relocated 
to the empty spaces. In 2015 even stronger rehabilitation 
works were performed, forcing the closure of the shopping 
centre between July and November, 2015. Some of the brands 
that belonged to the Jerónimo Martins company that were 
being sold inside the hypermarket, left these premises to 
occupy individual stores (mainly clothes, shoes and wellness). 
Because they demanded a significant amount of sales area, 
in some cases the physical space of more than one store was 
grouped into one, thus maintaining the overall sales areas 
but diminishing the number of stores and the vacancy rate 
(which was 0% at the time of the fieldwork in 2017):
“What we try is that the tenant mix be convenient for the 
costumer” (Retrieved from the interview: author's translation).
Additionally, the tenant mix was rearranged to include 
convenience stores, such as a medical clinic and shoemakers. 
The hypermarket remained as the main anchor store of the 
shopping centre. With the rearrangement of the tenant mix, 
the shopping centre management structure clearly intended 
to place PDT not as a shopping centre with several anchor 
stores but as a retail precinct with a considerable number 
of convenience stores (not the retail concept but in what 
regards to the quick access to the stores). In this particular 
case, this feature is enhanced by the availability of a free 
large parking space.
4.4 Summary
Altogether, the adopted strategies in these three shopping 
centres share some similarities but include some specific 
elements for each one. As shown in Table 5, the analysis 
Shopping centre Dolce Vita Monumental Fonte Nova Feira Nova de Telheiras
Decline situation Period 2007; 2011 2010–2014 2005–2010
Causes Outdated Economic crisis; 
competition from new 
shopping centres
Outdated (coinciding with 
ownership change)
Resilience strategies Introduced only 
occasionally
Physical rehabilitation; 
Food court enlargement; 
tenant mix reformulation
Food court enlargement; 
gymnasium; enlargement 
of the supermarket; 
parking lot
Physical rehabilitation; 
withdrawal of own brands 
from the hypermarket to 
the shopping centre stores; 
union of several stores in 
one; tenant mix
Regular Changes in the tenant mix Changes in management 
(risk sharing); tenant mix 
maintained
Hypermarket constant 
modernisation features
Threats Shopping centres 
nearby
Shopping centres in the 
Lisbon region
Other hypermarkets
Strengths Cultural heritage; 
convenience
Convenience Location; convenience
Tab. 5: Synthesis of the resilience features of the three analysed shopping centres
Source: author's interpretation
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reveals a relevant variety of features. The period and causes 
of the decline situations are different or, at least, never fully 
coincide. The same happens with the strengths and threats 
as proclaimed by the interviewees, which reflect the strategic 
orientations of each of the shopping centres.
Regarding the resilience strategies, we have divided them 
in two: regular and occasional. In the first case, they refer to 
measures implemented with some regularity and are mainly 
interventions at a lower depth, aiming at maintaining the 
vitality and viability of the retail precinct. In the second case, 
they refer to in-depth measures with the aim of changing 
more significantly certain characteristics of the shopping 
centre. Because of this, these latter interventions were only 
implemented rarely.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Retailing is a very dynamic sector. Shopping centres have 
been dominant in this sector for several recent decades. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that such shopping centres 
are not subject to threat (as to existence) and to become 
obsolete. The designation of dead malls fits such cases. 
Although evidenced first in the North-American context, 
this is not a process exclusive to this geographical region. 
In this article, we aimed to investigate this subject using 
Lisbon as a case study. The appearance and dissemination 
of shopping centres in the Lisbon region happened relatively 
quickly and threatened not only traditional retail located in 
high streets – but also the viability of older shopping centres.
With respect to our first research question, the base line 
for: “What is the current situation of the shopping centres 
operating in Lisbon compared to the base-line year 1999?” – 
with a few exceptions, the network of shopping centres in 
Lisbon in 1999 comprised very small retail precincts, the 
majority of which was mainly real estate developments with 
scarce or no professional management. Because of this, they 
were deeply affected by the appearance of new shopping 
centres, with professional management structures and 
regional catchment areas. Thus, between 1999 and 2017 the 
number of “vital” shopping centres diminished from 21 to 10. 
On the other hand, in 1999 four shopping centres were 
classified as “dead malls”, whereas in 2017, 22 structures fit 
this category (15 of which were in fact closed). Considering 
these data, however, the overall vacancy rate did not increase 
as much as one might have expected (from 15.7% to 24.9%). 
This not so high increase (as might be expected) is masked 
by some remodelling, which reduced the number of stores 
and/or retail floorspace. Faced with the decreasing viability 
of their retail precincts, the management structures forced 
the closure of several floors and allowed the physical space 
of several stores to be assembled. With a decreasing real 
estate value, during the fieldwork it was possible to realise 
that the majority of stores that are still open in the less 
viable shopping centres are occupied with business with low 
added-value, such as sewing services, shoemakers, insurance 
companies, real estate agents and others.
Furthermore, these businesses are mostly located on the 
ground level and in the stores with a showcase for the street. 
The findings are in line with the conclusions of the Congress 
for the New Urbanism (2001) regarding the North American 
context, i.e. although, currently, the majority of shopping 
centres do not possess a commercial use, their physical space 
is still seen as a mere real estate product. Thus, spaces are 
leased as much as possible to all kinds of uses. Taking Lowry’s 
life cycle in consideration, if in 1999 one could consider that 
the majority of shopping centres were in the maturity stage, 
in 2017 they have clearly reached the decline stage. Because 
the aforementioned Lowry life cycle theory (1997) assumes 
that decline is not inevitable, this evolution means that the 
management structures of those shopping centres were not 
able to introduce resilience measures that would prevent the 
decline of those retail precincts.
To answer our second research question: “What have 
been the resilience features introduced for the ones still 
operating?”, we have deepened our analysis and focused on 
three shopping centres. They have differed from the general 
trend and managed to remain viable in the analysed period. 
Although with several differences, they share some relevant 
characteristics: namely, the existence of a planned tenant 
mix, food court, anchor stores, a professional management 
structure and the stores ownership being concentrated in one 
company. It was these common characteristics that appear 
to be crucial for the resilience of these shopping centres. 
Parking was also a crucial feature for Dolce Vita Monumental 
and Pingo Doce Telheiras. The analysis of Fonte Nova also 
attested to this relevant factor because the construction of 
access to parking lots (previously not available) was one of 
the resilience strategies adopted by this shopping centre. 
Other resilience strategies were incorporated and they 
also enhance the relevance of a professional management 
structure. The synthetic information in Table 5 allows 
us to understand that different strategies can be put in 
place if the strengths of each shopping centre are taken 
in consideration. Physical rehabilitation seems to be 
crucial but just to some extent. If strong transformations 
were performed in two of the analysed shopping centres, 
they were carried out as an exceptional measure in order 
to deeply overcome the negative situations in which 
they found themselves. Once this stage was completed, it 
proved to be more effective to continuously develop shallow 
improvements. The enlargement and rearrangement of 
the food court was another major strategy, attesting to its 
current relevance, oriented at a two-fold audience: in the 
first case, oriented to consumers that work in the vicinities 
and use the food court for lunch: secondly, leisure-oriented 
for people that use the shopping centre to walk, shop or just 
to meet with friends.
The ability to rearrange the tenant mix is another relevant 
strategy. The chosen case studies show us how this strategy 
can be used differently. In Dolce Vita Monumental and Pingo 
Doce de Telheiras, this was a strategy to attract new and 
better stores for the shopping centre (from the same and 
different typologies) in order to increase their attractiveness. 
In Fonte Nova, this strategy was mainly used to control 
which stores entered into the shopping centre, denying the 
opening of stores that could lessen the quality of the tenant 
mix. Nevertheless, in this shopping centre this strategy was 
also used to incorporate a gymnasium (replacing an outdated 
and less attractive cinema) and to increase the retail 
floorspace of the already existing supermarket. Besides these 
strategies, two more can be demonstrated that are related to 
the shopping centre business management strategy. In Fonte 
Nova, following the economic crisis that put into question 
the viability of some of the existing stores and made it 
difficult to attract new stores, a sharing risk policy was put 
into practice, i.e. the rental price became dependent on the 
value of sales made by the respective store. In Pingo Doce de 
Telheiras, several own brands that belong to the same owner 
left the hypermarket and occupied the individual stores of 
the shopping centre. Overall, it was the relevance of the 
management structures and their ability to control these 
elements that dictated the resilience of the shopping centres 
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in this analysis. This control of the tenant mix is only possible 
if all stores of a given shopping centre belong to the same 
company, which can, thus, plan what type of store they want 
in the retail premise or even which ones do not contribute to 
its proper functioning. In the three case studies, any of the 
implemented resilience measures would be possible without 
the existence of a management structure.
Finally, another cross-cutting aspect of the three shopping 
centres is the intentional strategy of their management 
structures to make convenience one of its major strengths. 
Faced with the difficulty of competing with larger and newer 
retail precincts, the ease and speed with which purchases can 
be made is seen as an essential component for the viability 
of the analysed shopping centres. Connecting these findings 
with the theoretical discussions, it became evident that the 
adopted resilience strategies fit more than one perspective. 
The more in-depth measures are more connected with the 
engineering approach, i.e. the ones that were developed after 
the shopping centres experienced some decline and had to 
rearrange themselves to return to an equilibrium status. 
The adaptive resilience measures are the ones that have 
been implemented since the in-depth measures. In this case, 
it seems clear that the management structures are adopting 
an anticipatory approach, continuously adapting the retail 
precinct as a way to remain viable.
Now-a-days, the high number of shopping centres that are 
not vital, according to the classification adopted in this article, 
is significant. This may raise substantial challenges for urban 
planning in the near future. Because the problems affecting 
the majority of shopping centres have a structural nature 
(mostly due to their physical and management inadequacy), 
it is predictable that the number of dead malls will increase. 
Additionally, following the same rationale, one may expect 
that the majority (if not all) of shopping centres classified as 
struggling and greyfields will continue to decline, enlarging 
the number of dead malls, which will give the problem a 
further dimension. Indeed, because most of such shopping 
centres were conceived and maintained as mere real estate 
developments, they can hardly be considered simply a retail 
problem. Furthermore, because they occupy a vast area of 
the valued urban area of the city centre of Lisbon, they are 
at present an increasing urban planning problem.
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